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Abstract
International legal instruments do not explicitly recognize well-being as an autonomous legal concept with a clearly defined meaning, scope, or normative implications for fundamental rights and other areas of international law. Although its legal status remains insufficiently explored, well-being has gained increasing significance through the interpretation of international courts and judicial bodies, particularly in the fields of human rights protection, environmental law, and climate litigation. The absence of a universally accepted definition raises important questions concerning its legal nature and potential recognition as a principle of international law. This article examines the conceptual foundations and evolving significance of well-being in international law, with particular emphasis on the jurisprudence of the International Court of Justice and other international and regional judicial bodies. Through an analysis of relevant legal instruments and case law, it explores whether well-being can be regarded as an emerging legal principle, an interpretative standard, or primarily a policy-oriented objective. The analysis highlights the multidimensional character of well-being, encompassing physical and mental health, economic stability, social inclusion, and environmental conditions, and examines its growing relevance within the broader framework of sustainable development and international legal obligations.
Key-words: soft law, international jurisprudence, human rights, climate litigation.
JEL Classification: K33, K38
DOI: 10.62768/TBJ/2026/16/3/01
CUM SE CITEAZA - Please cite this article as: Moldovan, Carmen ‘Well-Being as a Cross-Cutting Principle in Sustainability: Towards a Common Standard in International Law?’, Juridical Tribune – Review of Comparative and International Law 16, no. 3 (October 2026): 357-385.
Abstract
The main aim of this study is to analyse the key international legal instruments relevant to current environmental challenges. International Environmental Law (IEL) has recently become a crucial segment of legislation, and although thousands of legislative acts target ecological issues, the success of such instruments is often questioned in practice and in the literature. This article focuses on environmental issues that are particularly alarming today, including human-induced biodiversity loss and wildlife crime. A wave of new legislation on environmental protection through criminal law at national, regional, and international levels has been adopted, raising the question of how Member States of the European Union will transpose the new Environmental Crime Directive. As a result, the study emphasises that, despite the growing number of environmental law instruments, harmonisation remains needed, and that national transposition of international instruments is critical. Another implication is that new trends, such as the rise of environmental rights and standalone ecocide legislation, are strongly influencing IEL literature and legislation. Meanwhile, although the developments seem recent, the theoretical foundations of these legal concepts have long been discussed. The article applies traditional legal research methods, including systematic doctrinal research and critical analysis of relevant academic literature and international law instruments. The article’s main question is whether current legal developments are sufficient to address the challenges posed by ecological despair.
Key-words: international environmental law, biodiversity, ecocide, environmental rights, criminal law, wildlife crime, Environmental Crime Directive.
JEL Classification: K14, K32, K33, K38
DOI: 10.62768/TBJ/2026/16/3/02
CUM SE CITEAZA - Please cite this article as: Zsigmond-Sziebig, Orsolya Johanna, ‘International Legal Responses to Environmental Destruction: Ecocide, Environmental Rights and Wildlife Crime’, Juridical Tribune – Review of Comparative and International Law 16, no. 3 (October 2026): 386-411.
Abstract
Traditionally, competition is closely linked to a number of economic indicators, such as consumption, the relevant market, competing companies, production and distribution chains, etc. A healthy competitive environment operates on the basis of supply and demand. However, we cannot speak of perfect competition, in which demand coincides with supply, which leads to some market dysfunctions, and the battle between competitors is not always a fair one, based on economic concepts. There has always been a tacit battle for expansion between competitors, whether vertical or horizontal. In addition, the pandemic has brought about many changes in consumer behavior, leading to a migration of consumers to the online environment. A new concept was born, that of the digital economy, where large technology companies — generically known as Big Tech — already had a significant influence on information flows and economic and social decision-making processes. The rapid growth of these platforms has created major challenges for competition authorities whose legal instruments were designed in a pre-digital economic context. In this study, we aim to analyze the main difficulties encountered in applying competition law in relation to tech giants. To this end, we will analyze the extent to which the recent Digital Markets Act and Digital Services Act regulations respond to current challenges. We propose to use a qualitative-comparative methodology based on a normative analysis of the European and American legal framework, correlated with an examination of relevant cases from the case law of the European Union and the United States (Google, Amazon, Meta, Apple, Microsoft), in order to illustrate the current and relevant overview of how traditional competition law paradigms work in the digital environment.
Key-words: Big Tech, competition, digital economy, Digital Markets Act, regulation, abuse of dominant position, antitrust.
JEL Classification: K20, K21
DOI: 10.62768/TBJ/2026/16/3/03
CUM SE CITEAZA - Please cite this article as: Irinescu, Lucia, ‘The Regulation of Big Tech: Antitrust Challenges in the Digital Economy’, Juridical Tribune – Review of Comparative and International Law 16, no. 3 (October 2026): 412-431.
Abstract
This article examines biometric surveillance as a highly intrusive tool of contemporary digital governance, weighing its security benefits against significant threats to privacy, informational autonomy, and individual liberty. Biometric data’s distinctiveness, permanence, and irreversibility justify elevated legal safeguards and strict limits on collection, retention, and processing, especially regarding automated facial recognition. Comparative review of international instruments and European Court of Human Rights jurisprudence suggests biometric measures may be compatible with human rights only when anchored in precise law, legitimate aims, necessity, and proportionality, supported by procedural guarantees and independent oversight. Recent EU regulatory trends, including the GDPR and AI Act, embody a rights-centred governance model that Ukraine should adapt. The article advocates tailored statutory definitions of permissible purposes, a general ban on indiscriminate mass monitoring with narrow exceptions, mandatory human-rights impact assessments, empowered supervisory bodies, transparency and retention rules, technical safeguards, and effective remedies. Coordinated legislative, institutional, and technological reforms are essential for lawful biometric governance.
Key-words: human rights, biometric governance, biometric surveillance, protection of privacy, European Court of Human Rights.
JEL Classification: K33
DOI: 10.62768/TBJ/2026/16/3/04
CUM SE CITEAZA - Please cite this article as: Karvatska, Svitlana, Florian Gheorghe, Ivan Toronchuk, Anastasia Labyk & Tetyana Hrekul-Kovalyk, ‘European Standards for the Protection of Privacy in the Context of Mass Biometric Surveillance’, Juridical Tribune – Review of Comparative and International Law 16, no. 3 (October 2026): 432-451.
Abstract
Religious values are protected by the legislator irrespective of country through the fundamental law of the state and other general and/or special laws. In the first part of the study we intend, on the one hand, to identify in Romanian legislation the legal rules that indicate the conduct to be followed, so that each individual can live their life on this planet as a moral person and understand what sanctions may be imposed in case of violation of the legal rules that protect religious freedoms, and on the other hand, to present a comparative study by analyzing similar rules of other countries. In the second part of the study, our goal is to also present civil procedure legal rules or criminal procedure legal rules by which the legislator emphasizes the role of religion in the process of law realization. Finally, by using the comparative method, we aim to determine the legal relevance of oath-taking or of affirmations equivalent to oath, which may also result from the analysis thereof as an essential requirement of the material element for the legal classification of acts provided for by the criminal law under the name of false testimony or perjury.
Key-words: law, religious freedoms, oath, criminal offence.
JEL Classification: K14, K24
DOI: 10.62768/TBJ/2026/16/3/05
CUM SE CITEAZA - Please cite this article as: Iancu, Elena-Ana & Adrian-Cristian Moise, ‘Comparative Law Study on Legal Rules Protecting Religious Values and Freedoms’, Juridical Tribune – Review of Comparative and International Law 16, no. 3 (October 2026): 452-477.
Abstract
This article examines when digital participation becomes an institution of administrative legality rather than a technologically mediated invitation to comment. Using doctrinal analysis, functional comparative law, and institutional design analysis, it compares the European Union, Taiwan, and Vietnam. It identifies a gap between participation as channel availability and participation as reason-constraining public procedure. To close that gap, the article develops the TRACES test: Timeliness; Reach and representativeness; Adequacy of information; Contestability of digital mediation; Explanation linking inputs to outcomes; and Supervision and remedies. Applied comparatively, the European Union offers constitutionalised and cycle-based consultation but uneven inclusion and limited remedial force; Taiwan demonstrates hybrid deliberation and institutional brokers yet remains dependent on political sponsorship and civic-technology capacity; Vietnam possesses substantial constitutional and statutory foundations and expanding digital infrastructure, but duties are dispersed and weakly integrated with reason-giving and review. The article proposes a rights-based participatory administrative procedure for Vietnam, including two-stage consultation, hybrid access, platform transparency, consultation-impact statements, participation officers, independent quality review, and proportionate remedies for material procedural defects. Participation is treated neither as plebiscite nor veto, but as a disciplined obligation of publicly justified administration.
Key-words: participatory democracy, digital state, comparative administrative law, online consultation, civic technology, Vietnam.
JEL Classification: K23, D72, H83
DOI: 10.62768/TBJ/2026/16/3/06
CUM SE CITEAZA - Please cite this article as: Tran, Thi Bich Nga & Ho Tran Hung, ‘Participatory Democracy in the Digital State: Comparative Administrative Law Perspectives from the European Union, Taiwan, and Vietnam’, Juridical Tribune – Review of Comparative and International Law 16, no. 3 (October 2026): 478-495.
Abstract
Artificial intelligence is increasingly used by intellectual property offices in trademark registration processes, particularly for tasks such as image search, classification of goods and services, and pre-examination support. These tools generally do not replace human examiners but instead help to structure the material they and applicants rely on. This can influence evidence selection, the description of goods and services, and consistency in examination practices. This article examines the role of IP offices under the EU Artificial Intelligence Act, focusing on their role as users of AI systems provided by external providers. It argues that most AI tools used in trademark registration are unlikely to be classified as high-risk systems under the Act, as trademark examination is not among the specified high-risk areas. Despite this classification, the use of AI in trademark processes requires procedural safeguards because it impacts property rights. The article advocates for proportionate governance, suggesting that while IP offices should not be categorised as high-risk AI deployers, they should adopt safeguards for high-risk systems, including transparency, human oversight, documentation, monitoring for bias, and the ability to contest AI-influenced outcomes.
Key-words: artificial intelligence, trademarks, EUIPO, AI Act, deployers, administrative decision-making, intellectual property.
JEL Classification: K11, K24
DOI: 10.62768/TBJ/2026/16/3/07
CUM SE CITEAZA - Please cite this article as: Koukal, Pavel, Polen Bayrak & Alice Černochová, ‘AI-Assisted Trademark Examination Under the AI Act and the Role of IP Offices as Deployers’, Juridical Tribune – Review of Comparative and International Law 16, no. 3 (October 2026): 496-526.
Abstract
This study examines prominent legal traditions to explore how jurisdictions structure their legal frameworks and how these classifications evolve under contemporary pressures. By analyzing legal families as popularized by scholars such as René David, Konrad Zweigert and Hein Kötz, the research traces the historical development of legal taxonomy from Mittermaier and Glasson to modern critiques by Glenn, Gordley and Husa. The objective is to assess the validity of traditional legal family classifications in light of legal pluralism, hybridity and globalization. The research employs comparative legal methodology, doctrinal analysis and some case studies of hybrid jurisdictions. The study investigates the collapse of rigid classifications through legal pluralism, legal transplants and alternative patterns of law, with particular attention to mixed legal systems as a distinctive legal family across several continents. The results show that rigid legal families have largely collapsed, with mixed and hybrid systems emerging as central models. The implications suggest that legal education, judicial training, and harmonization efforts must move beyond static categories toward more fluid, context-sensitive frameworks. Although the study identifies trends toward convergence, it acknowledges the enduring uniqueness of each legal tradition, emphasizing the dynamic and increasingly hybrid nature of contemporary legal systems.
Key-words: legal systems, comparative law, legal families, customary law, mixed legal systems.
JEL Classification: K10, K40
DOI: 10.62768/TBJ/2026/16/3/08
CUM SE CITEAZA - Please cite this article as: Hamdi, Wael, ‘Rethinking Legal Families in a Globalized World’, Juridical Tribune – Review of Comparative and International Law 16, no. 3 (October 2026): 527-542.
Abstract
Migration and asylum governance are embedded within a broader framework of international law, including the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol, international human rights treaties, and customary principles governing the protection of persons fleeing persecution and serious harm. Although international refugee law does not impose a formal mechanism for the allocation of responsibilities among states, the principle of international cooperation and burden-sharing has long been recognized as an essential component of refugee protection. The New Pact on Migration and Asylum of 2024 represents the European Union’s attempt to reform its migration and asylum governance after the institutional and political challenges revealed by the European migrant crisis. This paper examines the New Pact as a policy instrument aimed at strengthening solidarity and responsibility-sharing among EU member states in times of migration pressure. It analyzes the main mechanisms introduced by the Pact, including the permanent, mandatory, flexible and needs-based solidarity, relocation of asylum seekers, return sponsorship, and crisis-management procedures. Through a qualitative policy analysis, the study evaluates whether these mechanisms effectively address structural imbalances in the EU asylum system and whether they can enhance cooperation between frontline and non-frontline member states. The findings suggest that the Pact represents a significant step toward institutionalizing solidarity by introducing multiple forms of contribution that allow member states to participate according to their capacities and political preferences. As a result, while the New Pact offers an innovative framework for collective migration governance, its effectiveness as a tool of solidarity largely depends on the political will and sustained cooperation of EU member states. Overall, the study contributes to the broader debate on the future of EU migration governance and the challenges of balancing national sovereignty with collective responsibility in managing migration flows.
Key-words: migration governance; EU solidarity; New Pact on Migration and Asylum; asylum policy; burden-sharing; European Union; migration crisis.
JEL Classification: K33, K37, F22, F53
DOI: 10.62768/TBJ/2026/16/3/09
CUM SE CITEAZA - Please cite this article as: Guli (Hoti), Paulina & Arenca Trashani, ‘The Distribution of Responsibility in Relation to the European Migration Crisis’, Juridical Tribune – Review of Comparative and International Law 16, no. 3 (October 2026): 543-562.
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