

# Climate diplomacy – a growing foreign policy challenge

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## **Abstract**

*This paper provides an in-depth analysis of a significant global challenge the international organizations are faced within the 21<sup>st</sup> century - climate change. Climate change has detrimental effects on international security and stability. In the past decades, humanity has faced emerging natural occurrences such as the increase in the World Ocean level, higher frequency of monsoon rainfalls, impaired conditions of the ecosystems in the rain forests. The massive population increase in Africa and South Asia also points to the fact that natural resources are not infinite, and their spare use becomes a priority of worldwide importance. Managing climate change is a global problem, the solution of which mandates the unified efforts of the entire international community. And this is where climate diplomacy comes at play. The efforts of climate diplomacy need to be focused on two primary directions. The first priority is limiting global warming under 2°C compared to the pre-industrial levels and taking actions to reduce the harmful emissions of greenhouse gases. The second priority is about taking adequate measures to handle climate change consequences, amongst which the so-called climate migration.*

**Keywords:** *climate diplomacy, climate migration, climate change, challenge, international migration, sustainable development.*

**JEL Classification:** K32, K33.

## **1. Introduction. A deep-dive into climate diplomacy, the establishment of diplomatic capacities and systems for evading climate change**

### **1.1 Role and Scope of Climate Diplomacy**

**1.1.1** Climate diplomacy presents the practice, mechanisms, and response measures aimed at creating the international climate change regime and ensuring its effective operation. It is a logical consequence of the long-lasting concern about nature<sup>3</sup>. The present day's ecosystems are under permanent threat, hence the necessity of a common and consistent approach<sup>4</sup>. It is even more valid in relation to urban ecosystem services<sup>5</sup>. In its essence, the evolution of climate diplomacy defines the establishment of the climate regime. Climate diplomacy is multi-

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<sup>3</sup> Jedediah Purdy, "The Politics of Nature: Climate Change, Environmental Law, and Democracy", *The Yale Law Journal*, Vol. 119, no. 6 (April 2010) : 1122-1123.

<sup>4</sup> Gunderson Lance, Carl Folke and Marco Janssen, "Integrating Ecology and Society to Navigate Turbulence," *Ecology and Society*, Vol. 10, no. 1 (2005) : 1.

<sup>5</sup> Puay Yok Tan *et al.*, "A conceptual framework to untangle the concept of urban ecosystem services", *Landscape and Urban Planning*, Vol. 200, (April 2020): 11.

faceted and characterized by a variety of implications depending on geography, culture, or socio-economic landscape. Determining an issue in a multi-perspective manner helps mandate foreign policy responses tailored to the specific needs of different areas and sectors. Such formulations facilitate the continuous engagement on climate change by respective diplomatic networks. The narratives aim at providing concise lines of argumentation linking climate change challenges to more extensive or area-specific entry points and opportunities. It is essential as the economic impact of climate change is difficult to predict.<sup>6</sup> For building and living in modern cities, climate issue should be taken into careful consideration.<sup>7</sup> Closely related to this is the environmental account while making strategy for the land use.<sup>8</sup> Even on a stronger note, this applies to the sea and the ocean.<sup>9</sup> Though there seem to be numerous challenges to success, climate diplomacy must leverage the best practice of modern diplomacy and innovate in new approaches.

**1.1.2** Climate diplomacy has been evolving in scope and complexity as the climate regime changes its focus to implementation and climate risk management. This rapid change has brought about better inclusion of the climate change topic into vaster foreign policy and diplomacy. It has also evoked a rapid increase in joint alliances between state and independent players, and new approaches to establishing a global conversation on the consequences of, and solutions to, climate change. An example to illustrate this vividly is the Climate Vulnerable Forum, which aligns the political voices of the most vulnerable countries to aggregate their engagement in international discussions and negotiations.

**1.1.3** The practice of climate diplomacy further involves exerting influence. It requires three core capabilities:

- **Knowing yourself:** the capacity to formulate and enact one's national position based on an objective understanding of how climate change impacts specific domestic circumstances. Determining the national interest position is politically vested, dependent on the leading group, which may not always be representative, serve narrow interests, or simply not have sufficient information to define it accurately and in an actionable manner.
- **Knowing the others:** the ability to collect and decode information on the drivers, limitations, and capacities of others and how they assess your own position and plan.
- **Capacity to influence:** the capability to effectively integrate national priorities into political and diplomatic channels, craft a sound strategy and pursue effective implementation through building alliances.

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<sup>6</sup> Richard S J Tol, "The Economic Impacts of Climate Change", *Review of Environmental Economics and Policy*, Vol. 12, no. 1, (Winter 2018): 4.

<sup>7</sup> Jeremy G.C Carter *at al.*, "Climate change and the city: Building capacity for urban adaptation", *Progress in Planning*, Vol. 95, (January 2015): 26.

<sup>8</sup> Yansui Liu, Jintao Li, and YuanuyanYang, "Strategic adjustment of land use policy under the economic transformation", *Land Use Policy*, Vol. 74, (May 2018): 5.

<sup>9</sup> Patricia Villarrubia-Gómez, Sarah E. Cornell and Joan Fabres, "Marine plastic pollution as a planetary boundary threat – The drifting piece in the sustainability puzzle", *Marine Policy*, Vol. 96, (October 2018) : 213.

## 1.2 Two key narratives of relevance to climate diplomacy

**1.2.1** Climate change is undoubtedly a threat to humanitarian security. Some significant consequences of climate change entail resource degradation due to the growing intensity and frequency of disasters. For many countries securing the needs of local populations become increasingly challenging. The outcomes of these are connected to growing economic migration patterns. Changing geographies of natural resources may demand the need for international initiatives to balance interests and avoid disputes over borders. Foreign policies to address these challenges include joint risk assessments, the renewal and adjustment of international agreements, and natural resource governance initiatives.<sup>10</sup> Connecting policies and programs in three key areas – climate change adaptation, development and humanitarian aid, and peace-building – is necessary to help strengthen resilience to climate-fragility risks.

**1.2.2** Secondly, climate management presents an opportunity for sustainable development. A sustainable transformation of the economy can bring tangible improvements in energy and resource security fields. In this line of thought, the right and convincing communication of the economic benefits behind effective climate action. It is on the diplomats to communicate that a cost-benefit analysis behind climate action clearly indicates economic sense.

**1.2.3** Additionally, investment in environmentally friendly technologies serves as a source of new 'green jobs' while reducing the social and economic costs of pollution. Diplomacy has a sound role to play in defining and helping create the conditions for the sustainable transition needed for humanity. Bilateral and multilateral partnerships can serve as reliable instruments designed to overcome barriers to trade and investment in low-carbon technologies.

## 1.3 The landscape of challenges that climate diplomacy must address

Climate change shares many commonalities with other major foreign policy issues, such as nuclear proliferation and terrorism. Managing climate change is pivotal in ensuring people's prosperity and security but is defined by factoring in high levels of uncertainty as to the frequency, speed, scale of the threats appearing varies. Although they all pose risks to "hard security, there is no universal solution of prevention and a complex range of international cooperation across areas is mission-critical. Transport policy, security, active collaboration, technology assistance, and engagement with public attitudes are among the few different realms that need to be considered when managing climate change.

While the nuances of challenges are numerous, three core elements make climate change even more challenging than other global issues:

**Fast Pace:** the tipping points in the climate system and potential agreement of high carbon infrastructure severely mitigates the chances of a successful climate change policy implementation. If risks are not controlled timely, they cannot be retrospectively reduced back to safe (below 2°C) levels. The threshold of below 2°C mandates the transition to a zero-carbon global energy system over the next

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<sup>10</sup> *Climate Diplomacy. Foreign Policy Responses to Climate Change*, <https://www.climate-diplomacy.org/the-initiative/climate-change-and-security-un> (accessed Dec. 10, 2018, 3:00 PM)

few decades. The International Energy Agency's World Energy Outlook report indicates that in case low carbon investment is not vastly accelerated today, reaching 2°C would mandate the expensive and advanced retirement of energy sector investments over the next 2-3 decades.

**Extensive Co-ordination:** every country has a responsibility towards climate change, which impacts other states. While impact and emissions are pervasive, neither is evenly distributed. It could be that those states that have low emissions levels are affected first and hardest by extreme weather crisis. This depicts the asymmetrical nature of climate diplomacy in which few countries cause an event with externally harmful consequences. An effective climate risk control calls for global emissions to fall to virtually zero levels beyond 2050. All these emitting countries thus need to be part of even a medium-term climate agreement. There is no single omnipotent agreement that can prevent dangerous climate change, and addressing past emissions will be critical to securing a multilateral contract with the sound potential to prevent climate deterioration.

**Domestic change:** Effective climate risk management calls for national changes with a broad and profound impact on local economies and voters' lives. Fundamental changes as to the way nations consume energy are necessary. This goes for the prices of the electric utility, the products purchased for the households, the changes people can make to their homes. Trade agreements may have a similar impact on country economies, yet the regular implementation practice is through market forces. Climate agreements are politically controversial as they require explicit local government decisions for reforms, often in line with the political economy of incumbent energy production and impact consumers' energy and transportation decisions. Addressing and overcoming these challenges to transform a wide array of economics in a limited time frame will require unparalleled international cooperation and agreement. Exercising a state-of-the-art climate change diplomacy is essential to reaching this ambitious yet much-needed agreement.

## **2. The evolution of climate diplomacy and the international climate regime with a focus on EU embeddedness as a strategic priority topic**

### **2.1 An international agreement is vital to manage climate risk**

The United Nations General Assembly and United Nations Security Council have both stated that uncontrolled climate change poses a threat to international peace and security. In 2009, and on several subsequent occasions since, leaders from critical emitting countries have agreed to limit global temperature rises to below 2°C in order to prevent dangerous climate change. Recently the United Nations Convention on Climate Change agreed on a review to assess the adequacy of the below 2°C target in light of a possible strengthening to a 'below 1.5° C' goal.<sup>11</sup>

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<sup>11</sup> *IPCC Climate Report*, <http://www.un.org/en/climatechange/reports.shtml>.(accessed Dec. 11, 2018, 3:30 PM)

Undoubtedly, no country can control the climate risk it faces on its own. Climate change is more challenging than many other global issues because it is a race against time; delaying action makes lower climate risk levels unattainable. It is rightly claimed that it also requires profound choices that impact broad national interest debates such as development, energy, and consumption.<sup>12</sup> That is why an international agreement in this direction is of utmost importance.

A milestone in the global transformation towards a more sustainable and low-carbon society was reached in 2015 when a universal climate agreement was signed in Paris, the Agenda 2030 was adopted, and the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) were outlined. Both achievements can be seen as successful examples of multilateralism, with The Paris Agreement reached through the diplomatic effort by the EU and the French Presidency. A challenge remains to translate the agreement into an actionable plan, abided by the international community.<sup>13</sup>

As the effects of climate change are severe and global, climate diplomacy needs to occupy a strategic priority in international diplomatic relations. With climate-related developments impacting geopolitical stability, food and water supply - and hence the regional security of populations affected - as well as migration flows, the issue needs to be addressed on all levels and in all fields of foreign affairs diplomacy.

The Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on Environment, Public Health and Food Safety issued a common report<sup>14</sup> on this topic and put together recommendations for future EU climate diplomacy activities. This report sets the background for future engagement of the Parliament's Committees, especially the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committees on Environment, Public Health and Food Safety in climate diplomacy, and establishing the European Parliament as one of the foreign affairs players in the area.

This paper plays a pivotal role in tailoring the international role in climate diplomacy for EU, identifying the structure and strategic partners for EU climate diplomacy, thus supporting the establishment of a comprehensive future strategy for the EU. A strong leadership role of the EU in climate action is more important than ever and there is the need for a structured agenda outlining the path to strengthening cooperation between old and new partners – be it international actors, national governments, or non-state actors.

The external leadership role needs to be enhanced with a firm state climate policy. To further strengthen its' position as a credible stakeholder, the EU has to implement the Paris Agreement in a consistent manner and set review mechanisms. Central EU climate laws have been adopted, yet there is a need for further action and follow-up. The EU and especially its Member States need to be ready to improve the existing EU National Determined Contribution (NDC) for 2030 regularly review its own climate-related legislation and actions.

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<sup>12</sup> Nick Mabey, Liz Gallagher and Camilla Born, *Understanding Climate Diplomacy*, 2013, [https://www.e3g.org/docs/E3G\\_-\\_Understanding\\_Climate\\_Diplomacy.pdf](https://www.e3g.org/docs/E3G_-_Understanding_Climate_Diplomacy.pdf) (accessed Dec. 11, 2018, 6:00 PM)

<sup>13</sup> *The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and the SDGs*, [http://ec.europa.eu/environment/sustainable-development/SDGs/index\\_en.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/environment/sustainable-development/SDGs/index_en.htm). (accessed Dec. 11, 2018, 5:00 PM)

<sup>14</sup> *Report on climate diplomacy*, 2017/2272(INI), [http://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/CJ26-PR-616683\\_EN.docx](http://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/CJ26-PR-616683_EN.docx) (accessed Dec. 11, 2018, 3:30 PM)

EU climate diplomacy needs to become more coherent and coordinated. All EU institutions, along with the Member States, should actively partake in developing and enhancing EU climate diplomacy and action.

## 2.2 Strategic priorities of the EU's Climate Diplomacy Agenda

In the worldwide context of climate diplomacy, the European Union has a significant role to play. EU climate diplomacy needs to define the priorities in which cooperation and diplomatic efforts would yield positive results, derived from the areas where the EU has gained expertise and expert knowledge.

In addition to the severe impacts climate change has on the living environment of nature and people, it further has peace and stability implications. Climate change frequently serves to amplify threats and aggravate existing conflicts. EU climate diplomacy should focus its efforts on climate change migration nexus, which is increasingly threatening security and stability inside and outside the EU. Measures of prevention and improved risk management need to become critical topics on the EU climate diplomacy agenda, translated into actions and a joint effort between the EU institutions and the Member States. This will contribute to conflict prevention frameworks of the EU's and the Member States' Foreign Policy.<sup>15</sup> Other priorities should focus on partnerships on climate-related topics like carbon pricing, climate finance, fossil fuel subsidy phase-out, and clean technologies.

EU's expertise in establishing, amending and operating its carbon market is complemented by its experience through the Linking Agreement with the Swiss emission trading scheme and other international cooperation projects. These provide a solid backbone for the EU to promote third parties' efforts in carbon pricing mechanisms and further engage in the global co-ordination of carbon markets with the objective to attain better alignment in the mid-term and to create an international carbon market in the long-term.

## 3. Implications of Climate Change with the climate migrants, also known as climate refugees particular look into

No doubt, migration has become a great issue recently.<sup>16</sup> Its causes and numerous economic and societal aftermaths have been more or less explored.<sup>17</sup> But migration due to climate change is a relatively new phenomenon which deserves further study. The highly negative consequences of climate change will increasingly shape our security in the future, posing threats to the societies' normal functioning. This may have severe socio-political and economic implications for entire geographies. Countries with limited adaptation capabilities that lack stable institutions are likely to suffer severe impacts.<sup>18</sup>

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<sup>15</sup> *Report on climate diplomacy* (Footnote 14)

<sup>16</sup> Roxana Barbulescu and Adrian Favell, "Commentary: A Citizenship without Social Rights? EU Freedom of Movement and Changing Access to Welfare Rights", *International Migration*, Vol. 58, no. 1 (First Published 29 January 2020): 156.

<sup>17</sup> Yvonne Markaki and Simonetta Longhi, "What determines attitudes to immigration in European countries? An analysis at the regional level", *Migration Studies*, Vol.1, no. 3, (November 2013): 311-337.

<sup>18</sup> *Climate change a threat to security, food and humankind*, IPCC report, <https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2014/mar/31/climate-change-threat-food-security-humankind>. (accessed Dec. 15, 2018, 3:00 PM)

A new profile of climate diplomacy is emerging to specify and enact a full scope of policies and processes, including development cooperation, conflict prevention, and humanitarian aid. These new tools for foreign policy go above and beyond traditional climate diplomacy.

Moving from a risk analysis of climate-related threats to prevention requires a greater commitment to integrating climate change concerns into development, foreign, and security policies. Examples include strengthening diplomatic networks, building new alliances with partners, and raising awareness – not only of potentially negative climate change impacts but also of opportunities to embark on a sustainable societal transformation. This new foreign policy approach will contribute to implementing the landmark climate agreement reached in Paris in December 2015.<sup>19</sup> The method has already proven to be instrumental in bridging the divide between developed and developing countries.

People migrating for environmental reasons are protected by international human rights law. Movement of people is and will increasingly be even more affected by natural disasters and environmental degradation. Climate change will impact human mobility and this aspect needs to be controlled by the international community.<sup>20</sup>

Environmental migration takes place in many forms – i.e., forced or voluntary, temporary or permanent, internal or international. Three definitions are essential in the context of migration and environmental and climatic changes:

- **Environmental migrants** are defined as "persons or groups of persons who, predominantly for reasons of sudden or progressive changes in the environment that adversely affect their lives or living conditions, are obliged to leave their habitual homes, or choose to do so, either temporarily or permanently, and who move within their country or abroad."<sup>21</sup>

- **Environmentally displaced person** refers to "persons who are displaced within their country of habitual residence or who have crossed an international border and for whom environmental degradation, deterioration or destruction is a major cause of their displacement, although not necessarily the sole one." The term **disaster displacement** "refers to situations where people are forced or obliged to leave their homes or places of habitual residence, in particular as a result of or in order to avoid the effects of disasters triggered by natural hazards. Such displacement may take the form of spontaneous flight or an evacuation ordered or enforced by authorities. Such displacement can occur within a country or across international borders."<sup>22</sup>

- **Planned relocation** refers to persons whose **livelihoods** have been re-built in another place. Others have defined planned relocation as referring solely to the collective movement of a community, the "permanent (or long-term) movement of

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<sup>19</sup> *Climate change and EU security policy - An Unmet Challenge*, [https://carnegieendowment.org/files/climate\\_change\\_eu\\_security.pdf](https://carnegieendowment.org/files/climate_change_eu_security.pdf). (accessed Dec. 10, 2018, 10:30 AM)

<sup>20</sup> *Environmental migration*, <https://environmentalmigration.iom.int/environmental-migration>. (accessed Dec. 15, 2018, 5:30 PM)

<sup>21</sup> *Migration, Climate Change and the Environment*, <https://www.iom.int/definitional-issues>. (accessed Dec. 11, 2018, 3:30 PM)

<sup>22</sup> *Migration data portal – The bigger picture*, [https://migrationdataportal.org/themes/environmental\\_migration](https://migrationdataportal.org/themes/environmental_migration). (accessed Dec. 15, 2018, 7:30 PM)

a community (or a significant part of it) from one location to another, in which important characteristics of the original community, including its social structures, legal and political systems, cultural characteristics and worldviews are retained: the community stays together at the destination in a social form that is similar to the community of origin".<sup>23</sup>

### 3.1 How does climate change link to transnational migration?

Changes in the atmospheric composition occur from emissions of greenhouse gases. While there is consensus that climate change occurs and is driven by mankind to a large degree, there is less consensus about its consequences, particularly in the security sector. Climate change is a highly complex and long-term phenomenon, which is hard to grasp for "ordinary" citizens. Not everybody is affected by climate change equally, and its consequences are not easily observed from one day to another. That said one stream in the literature known as neo-Malthusian claims that climate change is a direct threat to international security. At the same time, the "Cornucopian" scholars argue that humanity will be able to adapt to the challenges of climate change through technological innovation.<sup>24</sup>

An observable implication of climate change is climate variability, meaning higher temperatures and rainfall. Higher temperatures melt the ice and, thus, raise sea-levels. Higher temperature further increases the likelihood of droughts water shortages. Increases in temperature and precipitation change the living conditions and present a survival threat on a large scale. The literature than has focused on climate-induced migration, albeit at a domestic level within countries and defines environmental migrants as follows: "Environmental refugees are these people who can no longer gain a secure living in their traditional homelands because of environmental factors of unusual scope, notably drought, desertification, soil erosion, water shortages and climate change also natural disaster such as cyclones, storm surges and floods in the face of these environmental threats people feel they have no alternative but to seek sustenance elsewhere, whether within their own countries or beyond and whether on a semi-permanent or permanent basis".<sup>25</sup>

Voluntary migrants have a variety of motives, and among the most common ones is the desire for economic improvement. People affected by climate change are unlikely to voluntarily emigrate because they are pushed away from their home by external forces (climate change). Human settlement patterns have been changing throughout history. And environmental migration is not a new phenomenon as human settlement choices have been driven by climatic conditions. Already Aristotle wrote that "the lands beyond the tropics are uninhabitable,"

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<sup>23</sup> Jane MacAdam, *Historical cross-border relocations in the pacific: lessons for planned relocations in the context of climate change*, <http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/UNSWLRS/2016/61.pdf>. (accessed Dec. 17, 2018, 9:30 PM)

<sup>24</sup> Alex de Sherbinin *et al.*, "Population and Environment", *Annual review of environment and resources*, Vol. 32 (2007): 345-346.

<sup>25</sup> *Ibid.*, 352.

implying that only temperate areas were habitable. Climate change is a global threat, affecting countries directly at large. It is usually not the case that only a few remote areas within a nation experience the impact of an altered climate. When the environment changes, this, in turn, directly affects the country as a whole.

Climate change also influences multiple political and economic characteristics of a state. Climatic change might affect both economic (e.g., unemployment) and political (e.g., violence) drivers of emigration that could influence a country in total, thereby creating an indirect path to relocation as well. Both mechanisms, a direct and an indirect one, could eventually lead to more migration and ultimately increase transnational migration as a country is affected by climate change in its entirety. Existing literature suggests that climate change will exacerbate source scarcity, create mass population dislocation, and, ultimately, fuel violent conflicts. In other words, climate change can be considered a source factor of human catastrophes. When subscribing to these effects, and further arguing that resource scarcity, mass population dislocations, and violent conflicts may not necessarily affect only remote, isolated areas of a state, but the country as a whole. In this sense, migration should not only be seen within countries but across states and environmental emigration induced by climate change is thus a global phenomenon.<sup>26</sup>

#### **4. A look into the most recent tools to manage climate diplomacy**

As mentioned throughout the years, the United Nations have demonstrated a long-lasting interest and commitment to climate issue and its multi-faced dimensions. One of the newest universal instruments related to the topic is the *Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration* (GCM). This international agreement presents a significant opportunity to improve the governance on migration, to address the challenges associated with today's movement, and to strengthen the contribution of migrants and migration to sustainable development. The process to develop this Global Compact for Migration started in April 2017, reaching its' culmination in December 2018 in a multi-national meeting in Marrakech, where over 160 Governments from each part of the world came together and unanimously adopted the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration.

By signing the Compact, governments committed to a global migration framework that protects their national interests and is about to bring advancements through better cooperation. This framework also clearly reinforces the fundamental principle that migrants should be treated with fairness and dignity.

While the positives the Compact agreement brings to the topic of Climate Migration are evident, it turned into one of the most disputable multilateral documents in recent diplomacy. Many countries - the United States, Australia, Israel, and a series of European states - disassociated themselves from the agreement, claiming that it plans to boost rather than control global people flows. Given the political sensitivity of migration in Europe and the US, it is not

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<sup>26</sup> Ibid, 368.

surprising that a UN compact on the topic is considered controversial.<sup>27</sup> The Compact does not impose obligations on the Member States and does not bring infringements on their sovereignty. It also does not create a right to migrate. Under international human rights law, citizens of a country have the right to enter, stay, and leave their state. Still, they don't have a right to go anywhere else unless they seek asylum or are authorized by another country to enter its territory. Developed countries are not operating as a charity when they invite immigration. For the most part, they fulfil economic needs in addition to their workforce. And when countries open their door not only to refugees, as they must, but to desperate people seeking assistance, whether temporarily or more permanently, these states should be assisted and celebrated, as they make the world a better place for all of us.<sup>28</sup>

The other tool that deserves to be pointed out is the '*Katowice Climate Package*' - the outcome of the UN Climate Change Conference in Katowice, Poland, 2-14 December 2018. Through a strong set of guidelines, it instrumentalizes the Paris Agreement 2015 climate change regime. The member states undertake the obligation to provide information about their domestic climate actions. A financial plan for helping developing countries' efforts is agreed upon. A mechanism for the assessment of progress in the development and transfer of technologies is included. The UN moved clearly from building vision to specific actions.

The mentioned political actions have severe theoretical underpinning.<sup>29</sup> *The scholars continue to explore the problem.*<sup>30</sup> There are some "lessons learned", but many challenges still have to be met.<sup>31</sup> Climate diplomacy has much other implication, e.g. tourism<sup>32</sup>, urban greenery<sup>33</sup>, urban psychology and behaviour<sup>34</sup>, even Coronavirus.<sup>35</sup> Even corruption could affect the environment and climate<sup>36</sup>.

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<sup>27</sup> *Future Implications of the Marrakech Migration Pact*, <https://ourworld.unu.edu/en/future-implications-of-the-marrakech-migration-pact>. (accessed Dec. 21, 2018, 9:00 PM)

<sup>28</sup> *Future Implications of the Marrakech Migration Pact*.

<sup>29</sup> Roldan Muradian, Mariana Walter and Joan Martinez-Alier, "Global transformations, social metabolism and the dynamics of socio-environmental conflicts", *Global Environmental Change*, Vol. 22, no. 3, (August 2012): 559-60.

<sup>30</sup> Kasia Paprocki, "The climate change of your desires: Climate migration and imaginaries of urban and rural climate futures", *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space* (First Published December 2019): 248-266.

<sup>31</sup> Bronwyn Hayward *at all*, "It's not "too late": Learning from Pacific Small Island Developing States in a warming world", *WIREs Climate Change*, (First Published 23 October 2019) <http://wires.wiley.com/WileyCDA/WiresCollection/id-80.html> (accessed Dec. 17, 2019, 9:30 PM)

<sup>32</sup> Siyao Ma, Christopher A. Craig and Song Feng, "The Camping Climate Index (CCI): The development, validation, and application of a camping-sector tourism climate index", *Tourism Management*, Vol. 80, (October 2020), 104105 - under press.

<sup>33</sup> Thomas Elliot, Javier Babí Almenar and Benedetto Rugani, "Modelling the relationships between urban land cover change and local climate regulation to estimate urban heat island effect", *Urban Forestry & Urban Greening*, Vol. 50, (April 2020), article 126650.

<sup>34</sup> Lorraine Whitmarsh and Saffron O'Neill, "Green identity, green living? The role of pro-environmental self-identity in determining consistency across diverse pro-environmental behaviours", *Journal of Environmental Psychology*, Vol. 30, no. 3, (September 2010) : 305.

<sup>35</sup> Dieter Helm, "The Environmental Impacts of the Coronavirus", *Environ Resource Economics*, Vol.76 (2020) : 21.

That is why it has to be taken seriously on all levels. Care of the climate is the care of the planet, and this concerns everybody.<sup>37</sup> From a pure holistic view maybe it is time to consider climate and related to it issues as economy.<sup>38</sup> As mentioned, social implications should not be underestimated.<sup>39</sup> As the climate is not a traditional issue of research<sup>40</sup>, innovative but regular scrutiny should be undertaken.<sup>41</sup>

## 5. Conclusion

At present, climate diplomacy presents a growing policy challenge. Its role is precisely in the ability to deliver the useful and timely construction of the complex of the international regime, and ensure its effective operation and evolution to address emerging challenges. Climate diplomacy is a crossing point between the national and global interest. Undoubtedly, the fundamental problem ahead of climate diplomacy is the juridical status of climate migrants. Their rights and obligations are not explicitly and fully regulated by international law, and this turns them into climate change victims. The Global Compact of Migration, signed in December 2018, is criticized for being high on ambition but low on hard law. Despite the numerous critics it faces, however, this paper defends the thesis that the Global Compact on Migration could be both a warning for future diplomacy and a conceptual framework to inspire new approaches to migration. The 'Katowice Climate Package' could also contribute to a better "climate" on the globe.

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<sup>36</sup> Dobrinka Chankova, "New trends in multi-faced corruption - a continuing obstacle for fair business in Bulgaria: our response", *Juridical Tribune - Tribuna Juridica*, Vol.9, No 3, (December 2019): 577.

<sup>37</sup> Matthew H. Goldberg, *at al.*, "Perceived Social Consensus Can Reduce Ideological Biases on Climate Change", *Environment and Behaviour* (First Published June 3, 2019): 495-517.

<sup>38</sup> Jouni Paavola and Eeva Primmer, "Analysis Governing the Provision of Insurance Value From Ecosystems", *Ecological Economics*, Vol. 164 (October 2019): 1-9

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